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Towards an Evidence-Based Approach to Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence 
Analysis 
Intelligence products have a degree of uncertainty associated with them. This is 
typically expressed using linguistic probabilities (e.g., ‘likely’), and some 
organizations have adopted standardized lexicons for communicating uncertainty. 
This paper empirically shows that intelligence analysts use a wide heterogeneity of 
language to communicate uncertainty. This does not include all of the phrases in 
standardized lexicons used by the intelligence community. In addition, analysts 
may use some phrases differently to that advocated. Miscommunication of 
uncertainty can have deleterious effects on decision-making, and so standardization 
of uncertainty communication should be evidence-based. This paper discusses ways 
in which such evidence can be generated. 
Keywords: intelligence analysis; uncertainty; probability 
 
Introduction 
Intelligence organizations are required to know and predict situations and events characterized 
by underlying epistemic (or internal) uncertainty – meaning that answers to questions are 
theoretically knowable but typically not fully known in practice
1
. For instance, how many British 
citizens are currently fighting with Islamic State in Syria? What are the chances that the national 
electrical grid computer network will be compromised in the next 12 months? Efforts to answer 
intelligence questions are constrained by the fact that relevant data may be missing, data 
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collection may be biased, and data may be unreliable as well as purposefully misleading. Thus, 
the judgments of current and future situations and events provided in intelligence reports have a 
degree of uncertainty associated with them. This uncertainty is expressed using subjective 
probabilities.
2
  
The effective communication of uncertainty is important. Customers of intelligence 
products (e.g., Government, defence, security and law enforcement) must make critical decisions 
based upon them, and so miscommunication of uncertainty can lead to poor outcomes (of even 
good analysis). In addition, cross-agency working and collaborative analysis necessitate reliance 
upon prior intelligence reporting, and so miscommunication of uncertainty can lead to compound 
errors in reporting. Erroneous and biased decisions that may result from the miscommunication 
of uncertainty have the potential to erode trust and confidence in intelligence products as well as 
undermine cross-agency working and collaborative analysis. In sum, it is critical that analysts 
convey the degree of uncertainty associated with their judgments in an unambiguous way.  
 
Communication of Uncertainty in Intelligence Analysis 
Typically, uncertainty in intelligence analysis is communicated using linguistic probabilities 
(e.g., ‘likely’, ‘very likely’), rather than numerically (e.g., percentages, probabilities). Indeed, 
research has demonstrated that people generally prefer to communicate the uncertainty in their 
judgments linguistically rather than numerically.
3
 This is particularly so when judgments are 
made under conditions of underlying epistemic uncertainty.
4
 
Linguistic probabilities may be preferred because people find it is easier and more natural 
to use language rather than numbers, and because linguistic probabilities allow expression of 
judgment uncertainty.
5
 Friedman and Zeckhauser (2012) found that US intelligence analysts used 
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linguistic probabilities to indicate the degree of confidence in their conclusions. Barnes (2015) 
observed that Canadian analysts were reluctant to communicate uncertainty numerically for a 
number of reasons. These included the perceived difficulty in calculating a numerical value for 
events with underlying epistemic uncertainty; a concern that numeric estimates would mislead by 
providing a false sense of precision; and anxieties over numerical values being used to evaluate 
analytic performance because they can be easily tested (e.g., by the use of Brier scores).
6
  
 However, the use of linguistic probabilities can be problematic. Research demonstrates 
that there is considerable inter-individual variability in linguistic probability lexicons i.e.,  
different people may use different phrases to refer to the same degree of uncertainty and/or they 
may use the same phrase to refer to different degrees of uncertainty.
7
 There is also sizeable intra-
individual variability such that people have broad or fuzzy interpretations of phrases in their 
lexicons. Finally, research has revealed that the interpretation of linguistic probabilities may be 
affected by the context in which they are used.
8
 The context may be externally provided such as 
describing a military operation as being a potential success or failure
9
 or internal to the person 
such as his/her attitudes towards the phenomena being judged (e.g., ‘global climate change’10).  
This has led some researchers and policy-makers to suggest that the use of linguistic 
probabilities should generally be avoided or minimized.
11
 One proposed alternative approach 
eschews both numbers and language, in favor of communicating uncertainty visually.
12
 For 
example, a ‘fuzzy’ pie chart can be used illustrate the subjective probabilities associated with 
alternative outcomes by dividing the pie into sections for each outcome and then shading each 
section in a color (such as black) so that it fades (e.g., into grey and then white); whereby the 
degree of fading represents increasing uncertainty.
13
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The most commonly recommended alternative approach is to communicate uncertainty 
numerically.
14
 This can be done in various ways, including using numerical point values that are 
precise (e.g., .85 or 85%) or imprecise (e.g., 75% plus or minus 10% or 65% to 85%). 
However, given the aforementioned preference for communicating uncertainty 
linguistically, some proposed approaches retain the use of linguistic probabilities. It is suggested 
that organizations should adopt a standardized lexicon for communicating uncertainty using 
linguistic probabilities.
15
 This refers to a list of selected phrases ordered from those representing 
the lowest to the highest degree of uncertainty (i.e., 0% to 100% or 0 to 1). An approach that 
builds upon this combines the selected phrases such as ‘very likely’ with numerical values which 
may be point estimates such as 80% or ranges such as 70% to 90%.
16
  
Finally, some have suggested that organizations could implement a specially designed 
translation tool that converts phrases from one person’s lexicon to another person’s.17 For 
instance, when Person A uses the lowest ranked phrase in her lexicon to communicate the 
likelihood of an event occurring to Person B, the tool would translate this into the equivalent 
(lowest) ranked phrase in Person B’s lexicon.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the intelligence community has opted for approaches that retain 
the use of linguistic probabilities. Specifically, some organizations have adopted a standardized 
uncertainty lexicon. Sherman Kent (1964), a director and scholar of intelligence analysis, was the 
first to advocate such an approach. His proposed seven-category lexicon included phrases 
associated with numerical point values and ranges. However, Kent’s proposal was not adopted 
by the CIA (for whom he worked) or other intelligence organizations at the time. In more recent 
years, organizations have been prompted to reconsider the use of standardized lexicons, partly in 
Dhami, M. K. (2018). Towards an evidence-based approach to communicating uncertainty in 
intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 33, 257-272. 
6 
 
 
 
response to the invasion of Iraq that was later regarded as having been based on misleading 
intelligence about the presence of weapons of mass destruction.
18
  
Standardized lexicons were introduced in the mid-2000s by the National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) in the US and by Defence Intelligence (DI) in the UK. Table 1a shows the most 
recent version of the NIC lexicon
19
 and Table 1b shows the current version of the DI lexicon
20
. 
As can be seen, the NIC lexicon comprises seven categories containing a total of 14 phrases that 
represent numerical values from 1% to 99%. Each category contains two phrases that are meant 
to be fully interchangeable. Two phrases are used to represent a broad midpoint of the numerical 
scale (i.e., 45% to 55%). The categories cover different numerical ranges (i.e., from 5% points to 
25% points), and so analysts are forced to use some parts of the uncertainty scale in a less precise 
way than other parts. Each category slightly overlaps with the next, thus potentially making it 
difficult for analysts to select specific phrases when communicating uncertainty at the top or 
bottom points of a category. 
INSERT TABLES 1A AND 1B HERE 
The DI lexicon comprises six categories containing a total of 10 phrases that represent 
numerical values from 0% to 100%. Some categories contain two phrases which are meant to be 
fully interchangeable. There is no language to represent some parts of the uncertainty scale (e.g., 
11% to 14%), including the midpoint, thus potentially forcing analysts to distort their 
communication of uncertainty by making their judgments fit with other parts of the uncertainty 
scale. As with the NIC lexicon, the categories cover different numerical ranges.  
Unfortunately, the standardized lexicons advocated by Kent, the NIC and DI have not 
been informed by empirical evidence (it is notable that Barnes [2015] developed a lexicon for a 
Canadian intelligence unit based on a review of research on the use of linguistic probabilities). 
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The value of lexicons that are not evidence-based may be limited. In particular, it is unclear if the 
phrases in the lexicons are those that would normally be used by analysts to communicate 
uncertainty i.e., language they are familiar with and comfortable using. It is unclear if analysts 
would consider phrases to be substitutable as advocated in the lexicons. It is also unclear if 
analysts would use the phrases in the lexicons as intended i.e., to communicate the degree of 
numerical uncertainty associated with them. Finally, given that there are some gaps in the 
numerical values associated with certain categories of phrases in the DI lexicon, it is unclear 
what language analysts would use to communicate uncertainty representing these gaps.   
 
Past Research on Intelligence Analysts’ Uncertainty Language 
There is a small body of research on how uncertainty is communicated by intelligence analysts. 
Freidman and Zeckhauser (2012) conducted a content analysis of 379 declassified National 
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs; US intelligence reports) written between 1964 and 1994. They 
found that analysts confounded likelihood judgments with judgments of confidence. Only four 
percent of the NIEs contained numerical expressions of uncertainty (e.g., percentages, odds). 
Eighteen percent did not provide any assessment of the uncertainty associated with the outcome 
being forecast. Freidman and Zeckhauser (2012), however, did not identify the specific phrases 
that analysts used to communicate uncertainty. 
In an unpublished Masters’ thesis, Kesselman (2008) searched the contents of NIEs 
written between the 1950s and 2000s. She counted the occurrence of an a priori list of 50 words 
and 13 phrases (e.g., ‘will’ and ‘almost certainly’, respectively), including the phrases in the 
NIC’s original lexicon. This revealed trends in language used across the decades. For instance, 
the use of ‘likely’ increased from the 1950s to 1990s, the use of ‘probably’ decreased over time, 
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whereas the popularity of ‘impossible’ was fairly constant. Historically, ‘will’, which can be 
interpreted as representing a high degree of certainty, was the most commonly used word by 
analysts. ‘Fifty-fifty’ did not appear in any of the NIEs, and phrases such as ‘even chance’, ‘very 
likely’ and ‘very unlikely’ were not particularly common. Kesselman (2008) also noted that the 
phrases in the NIC’s lexicon were not all commonly used by analysts in the NIEs. Overall, there 
was considerable variability in the language used to communicate uncertainty. By only searching 
for an a priori list of words and phrases, however, Kesselman (2008) was unable to identify the 
full variety of language that analysts use to communicate uncertainty. 
 Although the external validity of a content analysis of actual intelligence reports is high, 
this methodology is limited because it does not enable researchers to determine how analysts 
numerically interpreted their phrases, unless they also provided numerical values in the reports. 
The preference for communicating uncertainty linguistically rather than numerically suggests 
that this will be relatively uncommon. In fact, even under the circumstances when analysts are 
required to produce numerical values, these are typically not presented in the final intelligence 
report.
21
 Therefore, an alternative method for studying the language that analysts use to 
communicate uncertainty is warranted.  
Methods for Measuring Numerical Interpretations of Linguistic Probabilities 
Mathematical psychologists and decision scientists, Thomas Wallsten and David Budescu, have 
developed several methods for eliciting people’s lexicons for communicating uncertainty, as well 
as measuring how people numerically interpret linguistic probabilities.
22
 The methods (to be 
described below) are based on Wallsten and Budescu’s (1995) theory of linguistic probabilities.23 
This borrows from Zadeh’s (1965) theory of fuzzy sets in mathematics, and states that phrases 
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such as ‘very likely’ can be represented as fuzzy subsets of the 0 to 1 probability interval (or 0% 
to 100% percentage scale).  
Wallsten, Slomi and Ting (2008) used the method of eliciting individuals’ ‘probability 
signatures’ in their study of the language used by 119 CIA intelligence analysts to communicate 
uncertainty. This method was developed by Dhami and Wallsten (2005) and validated by 
Wallsten and Jang (2008). In Wallsten et al.’s study, analysts were first asked to list the phrases 
in their linguistic probability lexicons (with the size of the lexicon a priori limited from three to 
12). They were next asked to rank order their phrases from those representing the lowest to 
highest degree of (un)certainty. Then, analysts were asked to use their rank ordered phrases to 
describe the chances of a pointer landing on red in a spinner (or probability wheel) radially 
divided into red and black (analysts could use more than one phrase). The proportions of red 
randomly varied in 1% increments from 0% to 100%, and so participants responded to 101 
spinners. Each phrase is thus associated with a probability distribution.  
Wallsten et al. found that the average lexicon size across analysts was eight. The most 
commonly used phrases that appeared in approximately 70 analysts’ lexicons were ‘likely’ and 
‘unlikely’. There was considerable inter-individual variability such that 119 analysts used 170 
distinct phrases, and the rank ordering of these within lexicons varied by lexicon size. By 
contrast, there was much less intra-individual variability suggesting that individual analysts used 
phrases consistent with their rank order. This study therefore reveals both the language that 
analysts use to communicate uncertainty as well as their numerical interpretation of specific 
phrases.  
 Most recently, Ho, Budescu, Dhami and Mandel (2015) used the ‘multi-stimuli 
membership function’ method to study Canadian and UK intelligence analysts’ use of the NIC 
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and DI lexicons. The method was developed by Karelitz et al. (2000) and validated by Karelitz 
and Budescu (2004) and Dhami and Wallsten (2005). It involves presenting individuals with a 
series of scales that each correspond to a numerical value in ascending order from 0% to 100%. 
The number of scales depends on the intervals used (e.g., employing 10% intervals results in 11 
scales). Each scale consists of 21-points, and is labeled at each end from ‘not at all’ to 
‘absolutely’. Participants are asked to determine how well they think each numerical value (e.g., 
0%, 10% etc.) substitutes for a specific phrase (e.g., likely). Responses are provided by circling 
one of the 21 points on each scale. This method yields several measures, namely the ‘minimum’ 
and ‘maximum’ values that can be substituted for a phrase to some degree, the ‘peak’ value that 
absolutely substitutes for a phrase, and the ‘spread’ of values that can be substituted for a phrase. 
In Ho et al.’s study, a total of 61 analysts were each asked to rate the extent to which specific 
numerical values (from 0% to 100%, in 10% intervals e.g., 0%, 10%) could be substituted for 
phrases in the NIC and DI lexicons. For example, “To what extent, from not at all to absolutely, 
does 90% substitute for ‘likely’?” “To what extent, from not at all to absolutely, does 90% 
substitute for ‘very probable’?” and so on. 
Ho et al. found that the ordering of phrases was similar to that in the NIC and DI 
lexicons. In addition, some of the phrases considered to be interchangeable in the NIC and DI 
lexicons (i.e., remote chance/very unlikely, probably/likely, and very likely/almost certain) were 
numerically indistinguishable. However, the numerical interpretation of phrases differed from 
that advocated by the NIC and DI.  
 
The Present Study 
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The main aim of the present paper is to illustrate how an evidence-based approach can be used to 
inform the development of a standardized lexicon for communicating uncertainty. The study 
presented identifies the language that intelligence analysts use to communicate specific degrees 
of numerical uncertainty (e.g., 70%) by adopting a simpler method than that employed by 
Wallsten et al. (2008). The present study uses the ‘spinner’ task developed by Wallsten (1971). 
Variants of this task have been used to reliably and validly study peoples’ perceptions and 
communication of uncertainty.
24
  
 
The present study had three specific objectives. One was to measure the size of analysts’ 
uncertainty lexicons. A second objective was to examine the variety of language used by 
analysts. The third objective was to explore consistency in analysts’ use of phrases.  
 
In addition to the above, the present paper suggests that the spinner method can be used to 
empirically evaluate existing standardized lexicons and offer suggestions for their improvement. 
Although this was not the main aim of the present study, an illustration is provided to this effect 
by comparing the phrases in analysts’ lexicons with those in the NIC and DI lexicons.  
 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 26 practicing intelligence analysts participated in the study. They were drawn at 
random from one UK intelligence organization (see below for more details). Fifty percent were 
male. The average age of the sample was 38.54 years (SD = 11.18). Eighty-one percent of the 
sample worked as analysts on a full-time basis. Fifteen percent of the sample described their 
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current analyst reporting skill level as ‘novice/awareness’, 26.9% as ‘fundamental’, 26.9% 
‘practitioner’, and 30.8% as ‘expert’. Across the sample, the average number of years of 
experience working in the intelligence community was 9.73 years (SD = 9.23, range = .67 to 34). 
Spinner Task 
The phrases analysts use to communicate uncertainty were elicited using a spinner task. In the 
present study this involved presenting analysts with 11 circles radially divided into two sectors of 
different color (i.e., grey and black), over which a theoretical pointer can be spun, coming to a 
random stop. The proportion of area shaded black ranged from 0% to 100%, with 10% intervals 
(hence 11 circles). Although 10% intervals provide a cruder measure than 1% intervals, the 
former is less time-intensive.  
For each spinner, analysts were asked to state in words (and not numbers) what they 
thought were the chances of the pointer landing on black. Analysts were told that they could use 
the same phrase more than once if they needed to (see Appendix). This task, therefore, reveals 
the precise language that analysts use to communicate specific degrees of uncertainty. For 
example, it is taken that an analyst uses the phrase ‘highly probable’ to represent 90% if she uses 
this phrase when stating the chances of a pointer landing on black in a circle where 90% is 
shaded black.  
Procedure 
The intelligence organization provided a sampling frame of analysts who were formally 
responsible for writing reports. A sample of 60 analysts was selected at random to participate. 
They were contacted individually by the author, and told the purpose of the study, that it was 
unclassified, that they were chosen at random, that their participation was voluntary, and that 
there were no negative consequences for those who chose not to participate. The response rate 
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was 43%. Most of the non-respondents were those whose automatic ‘out of office’ reply 
indicated that they would be away during the study period. A few non-respondents replied to say 
they were no longer formally responsible for writing reports or that their current work 
commitments precluded them from participating during the study period. 
Analysts completed the study online, during their normal workday, over the two-week 
study period. The spinner task was presented before questions asking about the analysts 
demographic details (e.g., age, experience etc).  
The proportions of black in the spinner task were presented in three different orders, 
which were designed so that one version presented higher values before lower ones (i.e., order A 
= 90%, 100%, 70%, 80%, 50%, 60%, 30%, 40%, 10%, 20%, and 0%). Another version 
presented mid and extreme values before intervening ones (i.e., order B = 50%, 0%, 100%, 10%, 
90%, 80%, 20%, 70%, 30%, 60%, and 40%). A third version presented lower values before 
higher ones (i.e., order C = 10%, 0%, 30%, 20%, 50%, 40%, 70%, 60%, 90%, 80%, and 100%). 
The version presented was counter-balanced across analysts so that, for example, the first analyst 
contacted was sent order A, the second was sent order B, the third was sent order C, the fourth 
was sent order A, and so on. An inspection of the data revealed no systematic order effects. The 
study took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
 
Findings 
The analyses and findings are presented below in order of the objectives of the research. 
Size of Analysts’ Uncertainty Lexicons 
The size of the lexicons (i.e., number of phrases) used by individual analysts ranged from eight 
to 19 with a mean of 10.19 (SD = 2.55).  
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Variety of Language Used by Analysts to Communicate Uncertainty 
Table 2 presents the phrases used by analysts to represent each degree of numerical uncertainty 
from 0% to 100%, in 10% intervals. In total, 160 phrases were used. Some of these phrases may 
be considered variants of each other (e.g., no possibility/not possible; a possibility/possible; less 
likely/less likely than the alternative; equal/equal chance; even/an even chance; half/half and 
half; possible/possibly; probable/probably; certain/certainly/certainty; definite/definitely). 
Excluding variants, across analysts, 145 unique phrases were used to represent the 0% to 100% 
uncertainty interval.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
The number of phrases used across analysts to represent each 10% interval of uncertainty 
is shown in Table 3. When excluding variants, there was slightly less variety of language or 
fewer phrases used by analysts to describe the end-points (0% and 100%) and mid-point (50%) 
of the uncertainty scale, than the intervening points. The number of unique phrases used to 
describe each 10% interval ranged from six (representing 100%) to 18 (representing 10%). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Forty-eight phrases appeared more than once (i.e., by being used more than once by an 
analyst or being used by more than one analyst). Thirty-nine of the 48 phrases appeared in more 
than one analyst’s lexicon – in other words they were ‘mutual’. As Table 4 shows, half of the 
analysts used ‘likely’ and more than half (i.e., 58%) used ‘certain’ and ‘unlikely’. Twenty-one of 
the 48 phrases that appeared more than once either within or across analysts’ lexicons, were used 
to represent the end- and mid-points of the uncertainty scale. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Consistency in Analysts’ Use of Phrases 
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Of the 48 phrases that appeared more than once either within or across analysts’ lexicons, 21 
were used to represent only one value. For example, ‘impossible’, ‘no possibility/not possible’, 
‘nil’, ‘non-existent’, ‘none’ and ‘no chance’ were all used to represent 0% only. ‘50/50’, ‘as 
likely as not’, ‘equal/equal chance’, and ‘even/an even chance’ were all used to represent 50% 
only. ‘Certain/certainty/certainly’ and ‘definite/definitely’ were used to represent 100% only. 
The remaining 27 phrases were used to represent values that ranged from 10% to 50% points. 
For example, as Table 5 shows, ‘highly unlikely’ was used to represent 10% and 20%. ‘Possible’ 
was used to represent 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, and 60% (see Table 5). 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Comparing Analysts’ Lexicons and Existing Standardized Lexicons 
In the present study, analysts were asked which language they would use to represent uncertainty 
in 10%-point intervals, whereas the NIC and DI lexicons contain phrases that in addition to 
representing 10%-point intervals also represent 5%-point, 15%-point and 25%-point intervals. 
Thus, a comparison of the phrases in analysts’ lexicons with those in the standardized lexicons is 
necessarily limited for some parts of the NIC and DI lexicons. Nevertheless, a comparison can 
illustrate how data collected via the spinner method may be used to evaluate existing 
standardized lexicons.  
Table 6 shows the proportion of analysts who used phrases in the current NIC and DI 
lexicons. Some phrases (i.e., ‘almost no chance’, ‘highly improbable’, ‘roughly even chance’, 
‘roughly even odds’, ‘realistic possibility’, ‘nearly certain’) were not used by any of the analysts. 
By contrast, other phrases in the NIC and DI lexicons (i.e., ‘unlikely’, ‘likely’) appeared in 
approximately half of the analysts’ lexicons.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
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For those analysts who used phrases contained in the current NIC and DI lexicons, Tables 
7a and 7b show a comparison of how analysts used the phrases and how the NIC and DI 
advocate their usage. According to Table 7a, there were several points of divergence between 
analysts’ use of phrases and that advocated by the NIC.  
INSERT TABLES 7A AND 7B HERE 
 
Discussion 
Analytic judgments about current or future threats can contribute to consequential decisions 
about national and international security. The fact that analytic judgments have a degree of 
uncertainty associated with them suggests that it is imperative that this uncertainty is 
communicated in an unambiguous way. The effective communication of uncertainty can help 
customers of intelligence products make informed decisions. It can also enable other analysts to 
build appropriately upon prior intelligence reports. The present paper illustrates how an 
evidence-based approach can be used to inform the development and evaluation of standardized 
lexicons for communicating uncertainty in the intelligence community.  
The findings of the present study can be discussed in light of the small body of past 
research on intelligence analysts’ uncertainty language, as well as in relation to the existing 
policies for communicating uncertainty in some intelligence organizations as the NIC in the US 
and DI in the UK. There were some similarities and differences between the present findings and 
the findings of past research. For instance, the small, but representative sample of analysts in the 
present study had a somewhat larger lexicon size than that found by Wallsten et al. (2008).  
The present study demonstrated considerable variety in the phrases that analysts’ use to 
describe uncertainty in line with Wallsten et al. (2008) and Kesselman (2008). As in Wallsten et 
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al.’s (2008) study, ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’ were also some of the most commonly used phrases by 
analysts in the present study. The popularity of ‘likely’ in the present study reflects Kesselman’s 
(2008) observation of its increased use in recent years, whereas the popularity of ‘impossible’ 
reflects its continued use over time. Similarly, the less common use of ‘probably’ among analysts 
in the present study concurs with Kesselman’s (2008) reports of the decreased use of this phrase 
over time. However, the use of ‘will’ was much less common in the present study than in 
Kesselman’s study, and ‘very unlikely’ was more common. 
Finally, akin to the findings of Ho et al. (2015), we found that analysts’ numerical 
interpretation of phrases in the NIC and DI lexicons differed to that advocated by the NIC and 
DI, although the ordering of phrases was somewhat similar. By contrast to Ho et al. (2015), 
however, the phrases considered to be interchangeable in the NIC and DI lexicons were typically 
not interpreted as such by analysts in the present study. 
It could be argued that the wide heterogeneity of uncertainty language used by analysts in 
the present study underscores the need for a standardized lexicon to communicate uncertainty. In 
addition, the fact that approximately a third of the phrases in the NIC lexicon and one of the 
phrases in the DI lexicon (that represents a quarter of the uncertainty scale) were not used by any 
of the analysts, reinforces the importance of using an evidence-based approach to the 
development of such standardized lexicons.  
Indeed, although the comparison of phrases in the analysts’ lexicons with those in the 
NIC and DI lexicons is limited, the present study demonstrated several potential inconsistencies 
in how analysts communicate uncertainty and how intelligence organizations such as the NIC 
and DI currently mandate it should be communicated. Future research can use the spinner 
method to conduct a more precise comparison which can be used to evaluate several aspects of 
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the existing lexicons. For instance, whether analysts’ use of specific phrases falls within or 
outside the advocated ranges, and if outside, whether the phrase is used to represent a greater or 
lesser degree of (un)certainty. Another aspect that can be considered is if analysts do indeed use 
those phrases that are deemed inter-changeable as such. Finally, a comparison can reveal any 
discrepancies in the rank order of phrases as used by analysts and the order of these phrases in 
the existing lexicons.  
Potential Recommendations for Improving Existing Standardized Uncertainty Lexicons 
Although further, larger-scale research is necessary, the present findings point to several 
potential ways in which the standardized uncertainty lexicons can be improved. First, it was 
found that analysts’ average lexicon size is more than the seven and six-category lexicons 
currently used by the NIC and DI, respectively. This suggests that these lexicons could be 
expanded, and doing so would render a somewhat more precise communication of uncertainty 
because the numerical ranges associated with each phrase would be smaller. 
 Second, the numerical ranges associated with each category of phrases should be of equal 
size. This means that analysts would be able to communicate uncertainty across the whole 0% to 
100% with the same degree of precision. Currently, there is greater opportunity for precision at 
the top and bottom of the scale than the middle. 
Third, analysts were less likely to agree on the phrases to be used to communicate 
uncertainty between the intervening points of the bottom, middle and top of the uncertainty scale.  
Thus, it may be necessary to use multiple phrases for these intervening points on the scale (e.g., 
those from 10-40% and 60-90%). The NIC and DI lexicons currently have approximately two 
phrases for these points, and more may be warranted. Indeed, it has been argued that providing 
interchangeable phrases or synonyms allows for stylistic expression in intelligence reports.
25
 It is 
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of course important to ensure that interchangeable phrases are actually interchangeable in the 
minds of analysts. 
Fourth, although a comparison between the analysts’ lexicons and the NIC and DI 
lexicons is limited, it was found that analysts did not use the phrases ‘roughly even chance’ and 
‘roughly even odds’ which appear in the NIC lexicon. This is of concern because both of these 
phrases is used to represent the mid-point of the uncertainty scale. Similarly, the phrase ‘realistic 
possibility’ which covers the mid-point of the uncertainty scale in the DI lexicon did not appear 
in any of the analysts’ lexicons. This phrase is used by DI to represent a quarter of the scale (i.e., 
from 25% to 50%). Barnes (2015, p. 11) “banned” the use of this phrase in his Canadian military 
intelligence unit because it is a compound probability. Thus, the current NIC and DI lexicons 
contain language not used by analysts to communicate uncertainty, potentially leaving large and 
important portions of the uncertainty scale open to the use of other language or avoided 
altogether. Based on the present findings, potential phrases that could be used to represent the 
mid-point of the scale are ‘even chance’, ‘as likely as not’, and ‘equal chance’. These phrases not 
only appeared more than once either across- or within-analysts, but were also invariable – they 
were only used to represent one value i.e., 50%. 
Fifth, although some phrases in the existing NIC and DI lexicons (i.e., 'unlikely' and 
'likely') were more commonly used amongst analysts in the present study, these also 
demonstrated variability. ‘Unlikely’ represented from 10% to 40% and ‘likely’ represented from 
60% to 80%. Research also suggests that negatively worded phrases such as unlikely should be 
avoided because they are interpreted with greater variability than positively worded phrases (e.g., 
likely).
26
 Another phrase to avoid is ‘possible’, because although this was a phrase used by more 
than one analyst and has many variants, it represents too wide a range of uncertainty (i.e., 10% to 
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60%). It would be prudent to select phrases that demonstrate less variability in their usage. In the 
present study, these were phrases such as ‘impossible’ and ‘certain’.  
Barriers to Standardized Uncertainty Lexicons 
There are several potential barriers to the successful development and implementation of a 
standardized uncertainty lexicon, and future research is needed to deal with these challenges. 
One barrier is that standardization is problematic because people find it difficult to suppress their 
normal meanings of linguistic probabilities i.e., how they would use a phrase in an everyday 
context such as talking about the weather.
27
 An evidence-based approach to the development of a 
standardized lexicon may overcome this challenge i.e., selecting phrases that are not only 
commonly used across people, but are also used in the same way as do people, and with little 
variability in their usage by people. In addition, research could examine ways in which analysts 
can be trained to use a standardized lexicon. Furthermore, the technology employed by analysts 
when producing their reports could be designed to aid and guide them in using a standardized 
lexicon. 
Another barrier is that linguistic probabilities can be subject to context effects
28
, and be 
prone to self-serving interpretations
29, as well as interpretations affected by one’s attitudes to the 
subject matter.
30
 Further research ought to be directed at examining how specific intelligence 
contexts (e.g., the affirmation or negation of an event, the base-rate of an event, or the severity of 
an outcome) can affect the interpretation of phrases in a standardized lexicon. Mandel (2015) 
recently reported that a combined sample of intelligence analysts and university students had 
higher numerical interpretations of linguistic probabilities when they were used to describe a 
negative outcome rather than a positive one (i.e., a military operation failing v. succeeding). 
Research could also examine how interpretations of phrases in a standardized lexicon are 
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affected by relevant attitudinal variables (e.g., for or against military interventions), and analysts 
could be made aware of such biases. Overall, phrases whose usage is less sensitive to context 
effects ought to be selected for inclusion in standardized lexicons. 
Finally, the discrepancies in standardized lexicons used by different intelligence 
organizations means that they might employ different phrases to represent the same numerical 
values and/or the same phrase to represent different numerical values. This can lead to 
misunderstanding and miscommunication across agencies, and so a standardized lexicon that can 
be used across agencies is preferable. Since there are cultural differences in language use
31
, 
research ought to be conducted across intelligence organizations in countries that routinely share 
intelligence reports in order to develop a ‘universally’ useful standardized system. 
Beyond the directions for future research identified above, studies should also examine 
the communication of uncertainty in the context of the ‘big picture’. For instance, the existing 
NIC and DI lexicons ought to be evaluated from the perspective of the consumer of intelligence 
products. Mandel (2015) recently found that the average meaning assigned by consumers (in this 
case, students) to the probability phrases used by a Canadian intelligence unit corresponded well 
to the intended meaning. It is currently unknown if real consumers of intelligence products 
employing phrases from the NIC and DI lexicons would correctly understand the degree 
uncertainty being communicated. Relatedly, research could also examine the effects of 
miscommunication (e.g., in terms of errors in decision-making, erosion of trust, and reputational 
damage, etc.). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The approach of using a standardized uncertainty lexicon that contains a list of ordered phrases 
which map onto numerical values is essentially a compromise between those in the intelligence 
community who hold dear to their preference for communicating uncertainty linguistically and 
critics who argue that uncertainty in the intelligence domain should be communicated 
numerically. At some point in the future, attitudes and preferences may change, and so analysts 
may feel comfortable using numerical estimates. Amongst the many advantages of the numerical 
approach is that it affords scrutiny of intelligence products in terms of evaluating the accuracy of 
analytic judgments.
32
 For instance, Mandel and Barnes (2014) used a widely accepted 
quantitative procedure involving Brier scores (which can be partitioned into components 
measuring calibration and discrimination) to assess the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Such 
scrutiny can ultimately increase the intelligence community’s sense of accountability.33 In the 
meantime, the development of a standardized lexicon ought to be informed by research 
demonstrating how analysts as well as people generally numerically interpret linguistic 
probabilities. The present paper provides an illustration of how such research evidence can be 
gathered. 
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Table 1a. Standardized uncertainty lexicon used by the US National Intelligence Council 
 
Phrase Numerical value (%) 
Almost no chance/remote 1-5 
Very unlikely/highly improbable 5-20 
Unlikely/improbable (improbably) 20-45 
Roughly even chance/roughly even odds 45-55 
Likely/probable (probably) 55-80 
Very likely/highly probable  80-95 
Almost certain(ly)/nearly certain 95-99 
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Table 1b. Standardized uncertainty lexicon used by UK Defence Intelligence 
 
Phrase Numerical value (%) 
Remote/Highly unlikely < 10 
Improbable/Unlikely 15-20 
Realistic Possibility 25-50 
Probable/Likely 55-70 
Very probable/Highly likely 75-85 
Almost certain > 90 
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Table 2. Phrases used by analysts to represent 0-100% uncertainty 
  
Uncertainty 
value (%) 
Phrases
*
 
0 
 
Certain not to occur, definitely not, impossible, negative, nil, no chance, 
no possibility, none, non-existent, not possible, virtually non-existent, 
without doubt, zero 
10 
 
Doubtful, highly unlikely, low, low probability, minimal, possible, 
probably but not possible, remote, slim, slim but still possible, slim 
possibility, small, unlikely, unlikely but possibly, very low likelihood, 
very slight, very small, very unlikely 
20 
 
A little chance, a possibility, highly unlikely, low but still possible, low 
possibility, maybe, not very likely, possible, possible but unlikely, 
significantly less than alternative, slight, small, unlikely, unlikely but not 
improbable, unlikely but possibly, very unlikely 
30 
 
A possibility, improbable, less likely, less likely than the alternative, low, 
more likely, not probable, plausible, poor but still possible, possible, 
possible but less likely than not, probably not, reasonable, significantly 
less than alternative, some chance, unlikely 
40 
 
Almost as likely as not, fair, good chance, highly possible, improbable, 
just under half, less likely, marginally less likely than not, more likely 
than not, possible, possible but unlikely, probably not, reasonably likely, 
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slightly less likely than the alternative, somewhat less than alternative, 
strong possibility but less likely, unlikely 
50 
 
50/50, an even chance, as likely as not, equal, equal chance, equally 
likely, equally likely as unlikely, even, half, half and half, medium 
chance, mixed, possible, possible either-way, possibly, undecided 
60 
 
Fair, just above average chance, likely, marginally more likely than not, 
more likely than not, more than likely, over half, possible, possibly, 
probable, probably, quite likely, reasonably likely, slightly more likely 
than the alternative, somewhat greater than alternative 
70 
 
Fairly likely, good, greater chance, likely, more likely than not, more 
likely than the alternative, more than likely, probable, probably, quite 
likely, significantly greater than alternative, very likely 
80 
 
Greater likelihood, high, high but not certain, highly likely, highly 
probable, large, likely, more likely than not, more likely than the 
alternative, more than likely, probable, probably, quite likely, 
significantly greater than alternative, very likely 
90 
 
Almost certain, extremely likely, highly likely, highly probable, probable, 
probably, significant, significantly high, very great, very high chance, 
very likely, very likely but not certain, very probable 
100 
 
Absolutely certain, certain, certainly, certainty, definite, definitely, 
definitely will, overwhelming, will 
Note. 
*
Phrases in italics may be considered variants of one another. 
 
Dhami, M. K. (2018). Towards an evidence-based approach to communicating uncertainty in 
intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 33, 257-272. 
33 
 
 
 
Dhami, M. K. (2018). Towards an evidence-based approach to communicating uncertainty in 
intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 33, 257-272. 
34 
 
 
 
Table 3. Number of unique phrases used to represent each degree of uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty value 
(%) 
Number of unique phrases 
(excluding variants) 
0 13 (12) 
10 18 
20 16 (15) 
30 16 (15) 
40 17 
50 16 (12) 
60 15 (13) 
70 12 (11) 
80 15 (14) 
90 13 (12) 
100 9 (6) 
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Table 4. Proportion of analysts using the 39 ‘mutual’ phrases 
 
Mutual phrases Analysts 
(%) 
As likely as not, certainty, definite, definitely, improbable, low, no 
possibility, not possible, not very likely, possible but unlikely, reasonably 
likely, very probable 
8 
50/50, almost certain, certainly, highly probable, less likely, more than 
likely, none, non-existent, probably, slim 
12 
More likely than not, nil, small chance, very unlikely 15 
Equal, even chance, highly unlikely, no chance 19 
Highly likely, quite likely 27 
Impossible, probable 35 
Very likely, possible 39 
Likely 50 
Certain, unlikely 58 
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Table 5. Variability in analysts’ use of the 48 phrases that appeared more than once (see bolded) 
 
Uncertainty (%) Phrases
*
 
0 Impossible, nil, no chance, no possibility, none, non-existent, not 
possible 
10 Highly unlikely, low, possible, slim, small, unlikely, very unlikely 
20 Highly unlikely, not very likely, possible, possible but unlikely, small, 
unlikely, very unlikely 
30 Improbable, less likely, low, possible, unlikely 
40 Improbable, less likely, more likely than not, possible, possible but 
unlikely, reasonably likely, unlikely 
50 Even chance, as likely as not, equal, possible 
60 Likely, more likely than not, more than likely, possible, probable, 
probably, quite likely, reasonably likely 
70 Likely, more likely than not, more than likely, probable, probably, 
quite likely, very likely 
80 Highly likely, highly probable, likely, more likely than not, probable, 
probably, quite likely, very likely 
90 Almost certain, highly likely, highly probable, probable, probably, 
very probable 
100 Certain, certainly, certainty, definite, definitely 
Note. 
*
Phrases in italics may be considered variants of one another.  
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Table 6. Proportion of analysts using phrases in the NIC and DI lexicons 
 
Phrase in NIC lexicon Phrase in DI lexicon Analysts (%)  
Almost no chance  0 
Remote Remote 4 
 Highly unlikely 19 
Very unlikely  15 
Highly improbable  0 
Unlikely Unlikely 58 
Improbable (improbably) Improbable 8 
Roughly even chance  0 
Roughly even odds  0 
 Realistic possibility 0 
Likely Likely 50 
Probable (probably) Probable 35 
Very likely  39 
Highly probable  12 
 Highly likely 27 
 Very probable 8 
Almost certain(ly) Almost certain 12 
Nearly certain  0 
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Table 7a. Comparison between analysts’ use of phrases and NIC lexicon  
 
Phrase Numerical value in 
analysts’ lexicon (%) 
Numerical value in 
NIC lexicon (%) 
Almost no chance
*
 -- 1-5 
Remote 10 1-5 
Very unlikely 10-20 5-20 
Highly improbable
*
 -- 5-20 
Unlikely 10-40 20-45 
Improbable 
(improbably) 
20-40 20-45 
Roughly even chance
*
 -- 45-55 
Roughly even odds
*
 -- 45-55 
Likely 60-80 55-80 
Probable (probably) 60-90 55-80 
Very likely 70-90 80-95 
Highly probable 80-90 80-95 
Almost certain(ly) 90 95-99 
Nearly certain
*
 -- 95-99 
Note. 
*This phrase did not appear in any of the analysts’ lexicons. 
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Table 7b. Comparison between analysts’ use of phrases and DI lexicon 
 
Phrase Numerical value in 
analysts’ lexicon (%) 
Numerical value 
in DI lexicon (%) 
Remote 10 <10 
Highly unlikely 10-20 <10 
Improbable 30-40 15-20 
Unlikely 10-40 15-20 
Realistic possibility
*
 -- 25-50 
Probable 60-90 55-70 
Likely 60-80 55-70 
Very probable 90 75-85 
Highly likely 80-90 75-85 
Almost certain 90 >90 
Note. 
*This phrase did not appear in any of the analysts’ lexicons. 
  
Dhami, M. K. (2018). Towards an evidence-based approach to communicating uncertainty in 
intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 33, 257-272. 
40 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
When communicating uncertainty about various events (e.g., terrorist attacks etc), people 
often use probability phrases such as “likely”. We are studying the way analyst reporters use and 
understand these phrases. Can you please respond to the 11 questions below. Your responses are 
anonymous. 
Imagine a pointer in the middle of the circle that a machine can spin. Without using 
numbers, please state in words what you think are the chances of the pointer landing on black? 
You may use the same phrase more than once if you need to. 
 
The chances of landing on black are: 
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